

We are fixing broken links. Until they are fixed, below are some of the main links to D. Mayo's papers, the RMM volume as well as the more common/famous papers referenced on this blog.

Mayo Pubs:

### Books:

- [\*Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars\*](#), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- [\*Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science\*](#), co-edited with Aris Spanos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. [For some selected chapters by D. Mayo see "General Philosophy of Science" and "Philosophy of Statistics" sections below]
- [\*Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge\*](#), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996. (1998 Lakatos Prize)
- [\*Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management\*](#), co-edited with Rachelle Hollander, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

### Philosophy of Statistics:

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- Cox, D. R. and Mayo, D. G. (2011) "[A Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science](#): A Conversation between Sir David Cox and Deborah Mayo (as recorded, June 2011)." *Rationality, Markets and Morals (RMM)*, 2, Special Topic: Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science, 103-114.
- Mayo, D. G. and Spanos, A. (2011) "[Error Statistics](#)" in *Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of Philosophy of Science Volume 7 Philosophy of Statistics*, (General editors: Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard and John Woods; Volume eds. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm R. Forster.) Elsevier: 1-46.
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**RMM Special Topic:** Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should) They Meet in 2011 and Beyond? Guest Editors: Deborah G. Mayo, Aris Spanos and Kent W. Staley *Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science: The Two-Way Street*

### **Contributions (In alphabetical order)**

#### **Conversation David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo**

Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation  
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 103–114, Special Topic

[Full Text](#)

#### **Andrew Gelman**

Induction and Deduction in Bayesian Data Analysis  
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 67–78, Special Topic

[Full Text](#)

#### **David F. Hendry**

Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation  
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 115–145, Special Topic

[Full Text](#)



**Introduction Deborah G. Mayo**

Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)?

RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 79–102, Special Topic

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**Deborah G. Mayo**

Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations

RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 71–107, Special Topic

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**Comment Deborah G. Mayo**

How Can We Cultivate Senn's Ability, Comment on Stephen Senn, "You May Believe You are a Bayesian But You're Probably Wrong"

RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 14–18, Special Topic

[Full Text](#)

**Stephen Senn**

You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong

RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 48–66, Special Topic

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**Comment Stephen Senn**

Names and Games, A Reply to Deborah G. Mayo

RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 19–21, Special Topic

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**Aris Spanos**

Foundational Issues in Statistical Modeling: Statistical Model Specification and Validation

RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 146–178, Special Topic

[Full Text](#)

**Jan Sprenger**

The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo's Objective Bayesianism

RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 1–13, Special TopicAbstract

[Full Text](#)

**Larry Wasserman**

Low Assumptions, High Dimensions

RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 201–209, Special Topic

[Full Text](#)

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