Tour II How Not to Corrupt Power

5.5 Power Taboos, Retrospective Power, and Shpower

Let’s visit some of the more populous tribes who take issue with power – by which we mean ordinary power – at least its post-data uses. Power Peninsula is often avoided due to various “keep out” warnings and prohibitions, or researchers come during planning, never to return. Why do some people consider it a waste of time, if not totally taboo, to compute power once we know the data? A degree of blame must go to N-P, who emphasized the planning role of power, and only occasionally mentioned its use in determining what gets “confirmed” post-data. After all, it’s good to plan how large a boat we need for a philosophical excursion to the Lands of Overlapping Statistical Tribes, but once we’ve made it, it doesn’t matter that the boat was rather small. Or so the critic of post-data power avers. A crucial disanalogy is that with statistics, we don’t know that we’ve made it there, when we arrive at a statistically significant result. The statistical significance alarm goes off, but you are not able to see the underlying discrepancy that generated the alarm you hear. The problem is to make the leap from the perceived alarm to an aspect of a process, deep below the visible ocean, responsible for its having been triggered. Then it is of considerable relevance to exploit information on the capability of your test procedure to result in alarms going off (perhaps with different decibels of loudness), due to varying values of the parameter of interest. There are also objections to power analysis with insignificant results.

Exhibit (vi): Non-significance + High Power Does Not Imply Support for the Null over the Alternative. Sander Greenland (2012) has a paper with this title. The first step is to understand the assertion, giving the most generous interpretation. It deals with non-significance, so our ears are perked for a fallacy of non-rejection. Second, we know that “high power” is an incomplete concept, so he clearly means high power against “the alternative.” We have a handy example: alternative $\mu^{84}$ in $T^+$ ($POW(T^+, \mu^{84}) = 0.84$). Use the water plant case, $T^+$: $H_0$: $\mu \leq 150$ vs. $H_1$: $\mu > 150$, $\sigma = 10$, $n = 100$. With $\alpha = 0.025$, $z_{0.025} = 1.96$, and the corresponding cut-off in terms of $\bar{x}_{0.025}$ is $[150 + 1.96(10)/\sqrt{100}] = 151.96$, $\mu^{84} = 152.96$.

Now a title like this is supposed to signal a problem, a reason for those “keep out” signs. His point, in relation to this example, boils down to noting that an
observed difference may not be statistically significant – \( \bar{x} \) may fail to make it to the cut-off \( x_{0.025} \) – and yet be closer to \( \mu^{.84} \) than to 0. This happens because the Type II error probability \( \beta \) (here, 0.16)\(^1\) is greater than the Type I error probability (0.025).

For a quick computation let \( x_{0.025} = 152 \) and \( \mu^{.84} = 153 \). Halfway between alternative 153 and the 150 null is 151.5. Any observed mean greater than 151.5 but less than the \( x_{0.025} \) cut-off, 152, will be an example of Greenland’s phenomenon. An example would be those values that are closer to 153, the alternative against which the test has 0.84 power, than to 150 and thus, by a likelihood measure, support 153 more than 150 – even though \( \text{POW}(\mu = 153) \) is high (0.84). Having established the phenomenon, your next question is: so what?

It would be problematic if power analysis took the insignificant result as evidence for \( \mu = 150 \) – maintaining compliance with the ecological stipulation – and I don’t doubt some try to construe it as such, nor that Greenland has been put in the position of needing to correct them. Power analysis merely licenses \( \mu \leq \mu^{.84} \) where 0.84 was chosen for “high power.” Glance back at Souvenir X. So at least one of the “keep out” signs can be removed.

**Shpower and Retrospective Power Analysis**

It’s unusual to hear books condemn an approach in a hush-hush sort of way without explaining what’s so bad about it. This is the case with something called post hoc power analysis, practiced by some who live on the outskirts of Power Peninsula. Pst, don’t go there. We hear “there’s a sinister side to statistical power, ... I’m referring to post hoc power” (Cumming 2012, pp. 340–1), also called observed power and retrospective (retro) power. I will be calling it *shpower analysis*. It distorts the logic of ordinary power analysis (from insignificant results). The “post hoc” part comes in because it’s based on the observed results. The trouble is that ordinary power analysis is also post-data. The criticisms are often wrongly taken to reject both.

Shpower evaluates power with respect to the hypothesis that the population effect size (discrepancy) equals the observed effect size, for example, that the parameter \( \mu \) equals the observed mean. In T+ this would be to set \( \mu = \bar{x} \).

Conveniently, their examples use variations on test T+. We may define:

\[
\text{The Shpower of test T+: } \Pr(\bar{X} \geq \bar{x}_a; \mu = \bar{x}).
\]

\(^1\) That is, \( \beta(\mu^{.84}) = \Pr(d < 0.4; \mu = 0.6) = \Pr(Z < -1) = 0.16. \)
The thinking, presumably, is that, since we don’t know the value of \( \mu \), we might use the observed \( \bar{x} \) to estimate it, and then compute power in the usual way, except substituting the observed value. But a moment’s thought shows the problem – at least for the purpose of using power analysis to interpret insignificant results. Why?

Since alternative \( \mu \) is set equal to the observed \( \bar{x} \), and \( \bar{x} \) is given as statistically insignificant, we know we are in Case 1 from Section 5.1: the power can never exceed 0.5. In other words, since \( \bar{x} < \bar{x}_a \), the shpower = \( \text{POW}(T^+, \mu = \bar{x}) \). But power analytic reasoning is all about finding an alternative against which the test has high capability to have rung the significance bell, were that the true parameter value – high power. Shpower is always “slim” (to echo Neyman) against such alternatives. Unsurprisingly, then, shpower analytical reasoning has been roundly criticized in the literature. But the critics think they’re maligning power analytic reasoning.

Now we know the severe tester insists on using attained power \( \Pr(d(X) \geq d(x_0); \mu') \) to evaluate severity, but when addressing the criticisms of power analysis, we have to stick to ordinary power:

\[
\text{Ordinary power} \quad \text{POW}(\mu'): \Pr(d(X) \geq c_\alpha; \mu')
\]

\[
\text{Shpower (aka post hoc or retro power):} \quad \Pr(d(X) \geq c_\alpha; \mu = \bar{x})
\]

An article by Hoenig and Heisey (2001) (“The Abuse of Power”) calls power analysis abusive. Is it? Aris Spanos and I say no (in a 2002 note on them), but the journal declined to publish it. Since then their slips have spread like kudzu through the literature.

**Howlers of Shpower Analysis**

Hoenig and Heisey notice that within the class of insignificant results, the more significant the observed \( \bar{x} \) is, the higher the “observed power” against \( \mu = \bar{x} \), until it reaches 0.5 (when \( \bar{x} \) reaches \( \bar{x}_a \) and becomes significant). “That’s backwards!” they howl. It is backwards if “observed power” is defined as shpower. Because, if you were to regard higher shpower as indicating better evidence for the null, you’d be saying the more statistically significant the observed difference (between \( \bar{x} \) and \( \mu_0 \)), the more the evidence of the absence of a discrepancy from the null hypothesis \( \mu_0 \). That would contradict the logic of tests.

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2 In deciphering existing discussions on ordinary power analysis, we can suppose that \( d(x_0) \) happens to be exactly at the cut-off for rejection, in discussing significant results; and just misses the cut-off for discussions on insignificant results in test \( T^+ \). Then att-power for \( \mu_1 \) equals ordinary power for \( \mu_1 \).
Two fallacies are being committed here. The first we dealt with in discussing Greenland: namely, supposing that a negative result, with high power against $\mu_1$, is evidence for the null rather than merely evidence that $\mu \leq \mu_1$. The more serious fallacy is that their “observed power” is $shpower$. Neither Cohen nor Neyman define power analysis this way. It is concluded that power analysis is paradoxical and inconsistent with $P$-value reasoning. You should really only conclude that $shpower$ analytic reasoning is paradoxical. If you’ve redefined a concept and find that a principle that held with the original concept is contradicted, you should suspect your redefinition. It might have other uses, but there is no warrant to discredit the original notion.

The $shpower$ computation is asking: What’s the probability of getting $\overline{X} \geq \overline{x}_a$, under $\mu = \overline{x}$? We still have that the larger the power (against $\mu = \overline{x}$), the better $\overline{x}$ indicates that $\mu \leq \overline{x}$ – as in ordinary power analysis – it’s just that the indication is never more than 0.5. Other papers and even instructional manuals (Ellis 2010) assume $shpower$ as what retrospective power analysis must mean, and ridicule it because “a nonsignificant result will almost always be associated with low statistical power” (p. 60). Not so. I’m afraid that observed power and retrospective power are all used in the literature to mean $shpower$. What about my use of severity? Severity will replace the cut-off for rejection with the observed value of the test statistic (i.e., $Pr(d(X) \geq d(x_0); \mu_1)$), but not the parameter value $\mu$. You might say, we don’t know the value of $\mu_1$. True, but that doesn’t stop us from forming power or severity curves and interpreting results accordingly. Let’s leave $shpower$ and consider criticisms of ordinary power analysis. Again, pointing to Hoenig and Heisey’s article (2001) is ubiquitous.

Anything Tests Can Do CIs Do Better

CIs do anything better than tests . . . No they don’t, yes they do . . . Annie Get Your Gun is one of my favorite musicals, and while we’ve already seen the close connection between confidence limits and severity, they do not usurp tests. Hoenig and Heisey claim that power, by which they now mean ordinary power, is superfluous – once you have confidence intervals. We focused on CIs with a significant result (Section 4.3, Exhibit (vi)); our example now is a non-significant result. Let’s admit right away that error statistical computations are interrelated, and if you have the correct principle directing you, you could get the severity computations by other means. The big deal is having the correct principle directing you, and this we’ll see is what Hoenig and Heisey are missing.
Hoenig and Heisey consider an instance of our test \( T^+ \): a one-sided Normal test of \( H_0: \mu \leq 0 \) vs. \( H_1: \mu > 0 \). The best way to address a criticism is to use the numbers given: “One might observe a sample mean \( \bar{X} = 1.4 \) with \( \sigma_{\bar{X}} = 1 \). Thus \( Z = 1.4 \) and \( P = 0.08 \), which is not significant at \( \alpha = 0.05 \)” (ibid., p. 3). They don’t tell us the sample size \( n \), it could be that \( \sigma = 5 \) and \( n = 25 \), or any other combination to yield \( (\sigma/\sqrt{n}) = 1 \). Since the \( P \)-value is 0.08, \( (\Pr(Z > 1.4; \mu = 0) = 0.081) \), this is not significant at the 0.05 level (which requires \( z = 1.65 \)), leading to a failure to reject \( H_0 \). They then point out that the power against \( \mu = 3.29 \) is high, 0.95 (i.e., \( \Pr(Z > 1.645; \mu = 3.29) = 0.95 \)). Thus the power analyst would take the result as indicating \( \mu < 3.29 \). So what’s the problem according to them?

They note that a 95% upper confidence bound on \( \mu \) would be 3.05 (1.4 + 1.65), the implication being that it is more informative than what is given by the conservative power analysis. True, they get a tighter upper bound using the observed insignificant result, just as we do with severity. This they take to show that, “once we have constructed a confidence interval, power calculations yield no additional insights” (ibid., p. 4). Superfluous. There’s one small problem: this is not the confidence interval that corresponds to test \( T^+ \). The 95% confidence interval corresponding to test \( T^+ \) is a one-sided interval: \( \mu > \frac{\bar{X} - 1.65 \sigma_{\bar{X}}}{(\mu > (1.4 - 1.65) = -0.25) \), not \( \mu < 3.05 \). That is, it corresponds to a one-sided lower bound, not an upper bound.

From the duality between CIs and tests (Section 3.7), as Hoenig and Heisey correctly state, “all values covered by the confidence interval could not be rejected” (ibid.). More specifically, the confidence interval contains the values that could not be rejected by the given test at the specified level of significance (Neyman 1937). But \( \mu < 3.045 \) does not give the set of values that \( T^+ \) would fail to reject, were those values substituted for 0 in the null hypothesis of \( T^+ \); there are plenty of \( \mu \) values less than 3.045 that \( \bar{X} = 1.4 \) would reject, were they the ones tested, for instance, \( \mu < -1 \). The CI corresponding to test \( T^+ \), namely, \( \mu \) exceeds the lower confidence bound, doesn’t help with the fallacy of insignificant results – the fallacy at which power analysis is aimed.

We don’t deny it’s useful to look at an upper bound (e.g., 3.05) to avoid the fallacy of non-rejection, just as it was to block fallacies of rejection (Section 4.3), but there needs to be a principled basis for this move, that’s what severity gives us. Power analysis is a variation on the severity principle where \( \bar{X} = \bar{X}_\alpha \). But Hoenig and Heisey are at pains to declare power

\[ \text{Note: we are in "Case 2" where we’ve added 1.65 to the cut-off, meaning the power is the area to the right of } -1.65 \text{ under the standard Normal curve (Section 5.1)}.]
analysis superfluous! They plainly cannot have it both ways – they must either supplement confidence intervals with an adjunct along severity lines or be left with no way to avoid fallacies of insignificant results with the test they consider. Such an adjunct would require relinquishing their assertion: “It would be a mistake to conclude that the data refute any value within the confidence interval” (ibid., p. 4). The one-sided interval is $[-0.245, \infty)$. We assume, of course, they don’t literally mean “refute.”

Now maybe they (or you) will say I’m being unfair, that one should always do a two-sided interval (corresponding to a two-sided test). But they are keen to argue that power analysis is superfluous for interpreting insignificant results from tests. Suppose we chuck tests and always do two-sided $1 - \alpha$ confidence intervals. We are still left with inadequacies already noted: First, the justification is purely performance: that the interval was obtained from a procedure with good long-run coverage; second, it relies on choosing a single confidence level and reporting, in effect, whether parameter values are inside or outside. Too dichotomous. Most importantly: The warrant for the confidence interval is just the one given by using attained power in a severity analysis. If this is right, it would make no sense for a confidence interval advocate to reject a severity analysis. You can see this revisiting Section 3.7 on capability and severity.

**Inconclusive?** Not only do we get an inferential construal of confidence intervals that differentiates the points within the interval rather than treating them all as on a par, we avoid a number of shortcomings of confidence intervals. Here’s one: It is commonly taught that if a $1 - \alpha$ confidence interval contains both the null and a threshold value of interest, then only a diagnosis of “inconclusive” is warranted. While the inconclusive reading may be a reasonable rule of thumb in some cases, it forfeits distinctions that even ordinary significance levels and power analyses can reveal, if they are not limited to one fixed level. Ecologist Mark Burgman (2005, p. 341) shows how a confidence interval on the decline of threatened species reports the results as inconclusive, whereas a severity assessment shows non-trivial evidence of decline.

Go back to Hoenig and Heisey and $X = 1.4$. Their two-sided 95% interval would be $[-0.245, 3.04]$. Suppose one were quite interested in a $\mu$ value in excess of 0.4. Both 0 and 0.4 are in the confidence interval. Are the results really uninformative about 0.4? Recognizing the test would fairly often (84% of the time) get such an insignificant result even if $\mu$ were as large as 0.4 should lead us to say no. Dichotomizing parameter values as rejected or not, as they do, turns the well-known arbitrariness in prespecifying confidence levels into an invicious distinction. Thus, we should deny Hoenig and Heisey’s allegation that
power analysis is “logically doomed” (p. 22), while endorsing a more nuanced use of both tests and intervals as in a severity assessment.

Our next exhibit looks at retrospective power in a different manner, and in relation, not to insignificant, but to significant results. It’s not an objection to power analysis, but it appears to land us in a territory at odds with severity (as well as CIs and tests).

**Exhibit (vii): Gelman and Carlin (2014) on Retrospective Power.** They agree with the critiques of performing post-experiment power calculations (which are really shpower calculations), but consider “retrospective design analysis to be useful . . . in particular when apparently strong (statistically significant) evidence for nonnull effects has been found” (ibid., p. 2). They worry about “magnitude error,” essentially our fallacy of making mountains out of molehills (MM). Unlike shpower, they don’t compute power in relation to the observed effect size, but rather “on an effect size that is determined from literature review or other information external to the data at hand” (ibid.). They claim if you reach a just statistically significant result, yet the test had low power to detect a discrepancy from the null that is known from external sources to be correct, then the result “exaggerates” the magnitude of the discrepancy. In particular, when power gets much below 0.5, they say, statistically significant findings tend to be much larger in magnitude than true effect sizes. By contrast, “if the power is this high [.8], . . . overestimation of the magnitude of the effect will be small” (ibid., p. 3).

From the MM Fallacy, if $\text{POW}(\mu_1)$ is high then a just significant result is poor evidence that $\mu > \mu_1$; while if $\text{POW}(\mu_1)$ is low it’s good evidence that $\mu > \mu_1$. Is their retrospective design analysis at odds with severity, $P$-values, and confidence intervals? Here’s one way of making their assertion true using test $T^+$: If you take the observed mean $\bar{x}_\alpha$ as the estimate of $\mu$, and you happen to know the true value of $\mu$ is smaller than $\bar{x}_\alpha – \beta$ – then obviously $\bar{x}_\alpha$ exceeds (“exaggerates”) $\mu$. Still I’m not sure this brings agreement.

Let’s use our water plant accident testing $\mu \leq 150$ vs. $\mu > 150$ (with $\sigma = 10$, $\sigma/\sqrt{n} = 1$). The critical value for $\alpha = 0.025$ is $d_{0.025} = 1.96$, or $\bar{x}_{0.025} = 150 + 1.96(1) = 151.96$. You observe a just statistically significant result. You reject the null hypothesis and infer $\mu > 150$. Gelman and Carlin write:

[An] unbiased estimate will have 50% power if the true effect is 2 standard errors away from zero, it will have 17% power if the true effect is 1 standard error away from 0, and it will have 10% power if the true effect is 0.65 standard errors away from 0. (ibid., p. 4)
These correspond to $\mu = 152$, $\mu = 151$, and $\mu = 150.65$. It’s odd to talk of an estimate having power; what they mean is that the test $T^+$ has a power of 0.5 to detect a discrepancy 2 standard errors away from 150, and so on. The “unbiased estimate” here is the statistically significant $\bar{x}$. To check that we match their numbers, compute $\text{POW}(\mu = 152)$, $\text{POW}(\mu = 151)$, and $\text{POW}(\mu = 150.65)$:

(a) $\Pr(\bar{X} \geq 151.96; \mu = 152) = \Pr(Z \geq 0.04) = 0.51$;
(b) $\Pr(\bar{X} \geq 151.96; \mu = 151) = \Pr(Z \geq 0.96) = 0.17$;
(c) $\Pr(\bar{X} \geq 151.96; \mu = 150.65) = \Pr(Z \geq 1.31) = 0.1$.

They appear to be saying that there’s better evidence for $\mu \geq 152$ than for $\mu \geq 151$ than for $\mu \geq 150.65$, since the power assessments go down. Nothing changes if we write $\geq$. Notice that the SEV computations for $\mu \geq 152$, $\mu \geq 151$, $\mu \geq 150.65$ are the complements of the corresponding powers 0.49, 0.83, 0.9. So the lower the power for $\mu_1$ the stronger the evidence for $\mu > \mu_1$. Thus there’s disagreement. But let’s try to pursue their thinking.

Suppose we observe $\bar{x} = 152$. Say we have excellent reason to think it’s too big. We’re rather sure the mean temperature is no more than $\sim 150.25$ or 150.5, judging from previous cooling accidents, or perhaps from the fact that we don’t see some drastic effects expected from water that hot. Thus 152 is an overestimate. The observed mean “exaggerates” what you know on good evidence to be the correct mean (< 150.5). No one can disagree with that, although they measure the exaggeration by a ratio. Is this “power analytic” reasoning? No, but no matter. Some remarks:

First, the inferred estimate would not be 152 but rather the lower confidence bounds, say, $\bar{x} > (152 - 2\sigma_{\bar{x}})$, i.e., $\mu > 150$ (for a 0.975 lower confidence bound). True, but suppose the lower bound at a reasonable confidence level is still at odds with what we assume is known. For example, a lower 0.93 bound is $\mu > 150.5$. What then? Then we simply have a conflict between what these data indicate and assumed background knowledge.

Second, do they really want to say that the statistically significant $\bar{x}$ fails to warrant $\mu \geq \mu_1$ for any $\mu_1$ between 150 and 152 on grounds that the power in this range is low (going from 0.025 to 0.5)? If so, the result surely couldn’t warrant values larger than 152. So it appears no values would be able to be inferred from the result.

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4 You can obtain these from the severity curves in Section 5.4.
5 There are slight differences from their using a two-sided test, but we hardly add anything for the negative direction: For (a), $\Pr(\bar{X} < -2; \mu = 2) = \Pr(Z < -4) \simeq 0$. The severe tester would not compute power using both directions once she knew the result.
A way to make sense of their view is to construe it as saying the observed mean is so out of line with what’s known that we suspect the assumptions of the test are questionable or invalid. Suppose you have considerable grounds for this suspicion: signs of cherry picking, multiple testing, artificiality of experiments, publication bias, and so forth – as are rife in both examples given in Gelman and Carlin’s paper. You have grounds to question the result because you question the reported error probabilities. Indeed, no values can be inferred if the error probabilities are spurious, the severity is automatically low.

One reasons, if the assumptions are met, and the error probabilities approximately correct, then the statistically significant result would indicate \( \mu > 150.5 \), \( P \text{-value} 0.07 \), or severity level 0.93. But you happen to know that \( \mu \leq 150.5 \). Thus, that’s grounds to question whether the assumptions are met. You suspect it would fail an audit. In that case put the blame where it belongs.\(^6\)

Recall the (2010) study purporting to show genetic signatures of longevity (Section 4.3). Researchers found the observed differences suspiciously large, and sure enough, once reanalyzed, the data were found to suffer from the confounding of batch effects. When results seem out of whack with what’s known, it’s grounds to suspect the assumptions. That’s how I propose to view Gelman and Carlin’s argument; whether they concur is for them to decide.

### 5.6 Positive Predictive Value: Fine for Luggage

Many alarming articles about questionable statistics rely on alarmingly questionable statistics. Travelers on this cruise are already very familiar with the computations, because they stem from one or another of the “\( P \)-values exaggerate evidence” arguments in Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 5.2. They are given yet another new twist, which I will call the diagnostic screening (DS) criticism of significance tests. To understand how the DS criticism tests really took off, we should go back to a paper by John Ioannidis (2005):

Several methodologists have pointed out that the high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is a consequence of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming conclusive research findings solely on the basis of a single study assessed by formal statistical significance, typically for a \( p \)-value less than 0.05. Research is not most appropriately represented and summarized by \( p \)-values, but, unfortunately, there is a widespread notion that medical research articles should

\(^6\) The point can also be made out by increasing power by dint of sample size. If \( n = 10,000 \), \( (\sigma/\sqrt{n}) = 0.1 \). Test \( T^+ (n = 10,000) \) rejects \( H_0 \) at the 0.025 level if \( X \geq 150.2 \). A 95% confidence interval is \([150, 150.4]\). With \( n = 100 \), the just 0.025 significant result 152 corresponds to the interval \([150, 154]\). The latter is indicative of a larger discrepancy. Granted, sample size must be large enough for the statistical assumptions to pass an audit.
be interpreted based only on \( p \)-values. Research findings are defined here as any relationship reaching formal statistical significance, e.g., effective interventions, informative predictors, risk factors or associations.

It can be proven that most claimed research findings are false. (p. 0696)

First, do medical researchers claim to have “conclusive research findings” as soon as a single statistically significant result is spewed out of their statistical industrial complexes? Do they go straight to press? Ioannidis says that they do. Fisher’s ghost is screaming. (He is not talking of merely identifying a possibly interesting result for further analysis.) However absurd such behavior sounds 80 years after Fisher exhorted us never to rely on “isolated results,” let’s suppose Ioannidis is right. But it gets worse. Even the single significant result is very often the result of the cherry picking and multiple testing we are all too familiar with:

... suppose investigators manipulate their design, analysis, and reporting so as to make more relationships cross the \( p = 0.05 \) threshold ... Such manipulation could be done, for example, with serendipitous inclusion or exclusion of certain patients or controls, post hoc subgroup analyses, investigation of genetic contrasts that were not originally specified ... Commercially available ‘data mining’ packages actually are proud of their ability to yield statistically significant results through data dredging. (ibid., p. 0699)

The DS criticism of tests shows that if

1. you publish upon getting a single \( P \)-value < 0.05,
2. you dichotomize tests into “up-down” outputs rather than report discrepancies and magnitudes of effect,
3. you data dredge and cherry pick and/or
4. there is a sufficiently low probability of genuine effects in your field, the notion of probability to be unpacked,

then the probability of true nulls among those rejected as statistically significant – a value we call the false finding rate (FFR)\(^7\) – differs from and can be much greater than the Type I error set by the test.

However one chooses to measure “bad evidence, no test” (BENT) results, nobody is surprised that such bad behavior qualifies. For the severe tester, committing \#3 alone is suspect, unless an adjustment to get proper error probabilities is achieved. Even if there’s no cherry picking, and your test has a legitimate Type I error probability of 0.05, a critic will hold that the FFR can be much higher than 0.05, if you’ve randomly selected your null hypothesis from a group with a sufficiently high proportion of true “no

\(^7\) Some call it the false discovery rate, but that was already defined by Benjamini and Hochberg in connection with the problem of multiple comparisons. (see Section 4.6).
effect” nulls. So is the criticism a matter of transposing probabilistic conditionals, only with the twist of trying to use “prevalence” for a prior? It is, but that doesn’t suffice to dismiss the criticism. The critics argue that the quantity we should care about is the FFR, or its complement, the positive predictive value (PPV). Should we? Let’s look at all this in detail.

Diagnostic Screening

In scrutinizing a statistical argument, particularly one that has so widely struck a nerve, we attempt the most generous interpretation. Still, if we are not to jumble up our freshly acquired clarity on statistical power, we need to use the proper terms for diagnostic screening, at least one model for it.\(^8\)

We are all plagued by the TSA (Transportation Security Administration) screening in airports, although thankfully they have gotten rid of those whole body scanners in which all “your junk” is revealed to anonymous personnel. The latest test, we are told, would very rarely miss a dangerous item in your carry-on, and rarely trigger the alarm (+) for nothing. Yet most of the alarms are false alarms. That’s because the dangerous items are relatively rare. On the other hand, sending positive (+) results for further scrutiny – usually in front of gloved representatives who have pulled you aside as they wave special wands and powder – ensures that, taken together, the false findings are quite rare. On the retest, they will usually discover you’d simply forgotten to remove that knife or box cutter from the last trip. Interestingly, the rarity of dangerous bags – that is, the low prevalence of D’s (D for danger) – means we can be comforted in a negative result. So we’d often prefer not to lower the sensitivity, but control false positives relying on the follow-up retest given to any “+” result. (Mayo and Morey 2017.)

Positive Predictive Value (PPV) \((1 - FFR)\). To get the (PPV) we are to apply Bayes’ Rule using the given relative frequencies (or prevalences):

\[
PPV: \Pr(D|+) = \frac{\Pr(+)|D)\Pr(D)}{\Pr(+)|D)\Pr(D) + \Pr(+)|\neg D)\Pr(\neg D)} = \frac{1}{(1 + B)}
\]

\[
B = \frac{\Pr(+)|\neg D)\Pr(\neg D)}{\Pr(+)|D)\Pr(D)}.
\]

The sensitivity is the probability that a randomly selected item with D will be identified as "positive" (+):

\[
SENS: \Pr(+)|D).
\]

\(^8\) The screening model used here has also been criticized by many even for screening itself. See, for example, Dawid (1976).
The *specificity* is the probability a randomly selected item lacking D will be found negative (−):

\[
\text{SPEC: } \Pr(−|\neg D).
\]

The *prevalence* is just the relative frequency of D in some population.

We run the test on the item (be it a person, a piece of luggage, or a hypothesis) and report either + or −. Instead of populations of carry-on bags and luggage, imagine an urn of null hypotheses, 50% of which are true. Randomly selecting a hypothesis, we run a test and output + (statistically significant) or − (non-significant). So our urn represents the proverbial “prior” probability of 50% true nulls.

The criticism turns on the PPV being too low. Even with \( \Pr(D) = 0.5 \), with \( \Pr(+)\neg D) = 0.05 \) and \( \Pr(+)D) = 0.8 \), we still get a rather high PPV:

\[
\text{PPV} = \frac{1}{1 + \Pr(+)\neg D) + \Pr(+)D) = 0.8}.
\]

With \( \Pr(D) = 0.5 \), all we need for a PPV greater than 0.5 is for \( \Pr(+)\neg D) \) to be less than \( \Pr(+)D) \). It suffices that the probability of ringing the alarm when we shouldn’t is less than the probability of ringing it when we should. With a prevalence \( \Pr(D) \) very small, e.g., \( \Pr(+)\neg D) \), we get a PPV < 0.5 even if we assume a maximal sensitivity \( \Pr(+)D) \) of 1 (Van Belle 2008). In the field of diagnostics, it’s scarcely worthless: there is still a boost from the prior prevalence.

Ioannidis rightly points out that many researchers are guilty of cherry picking and selection effects under his “bias” umbrella. The actual \( \Pr(+)\neg D) \), with bias, is now the probability the “+” was generated by chance plus the probability it was generated by “bias.” \( \neg D \) plays the role of \( H_0 \). Even the lowest presumed bias, 0.10, changes a 0.05 into 0.14.

Actual \( \Pr(+)\neg D):= \text{“alleged” } \Pr(+)\neg D) + \Pr(−)\neg D)(0.10) = (0.05) + (0.95)(0.10) = 0.14.

The PPV has now gone down to 0.85. Or consider if you’re lucky enough to get a TSA official with 30% bias. Your “alleged” \( \Pr(+)\neg D) \) is again 0.05, but with 30% bias, the actual \( \Pr(+)\neg D) = 0.05 + (0.95)(0.3) = 0.33 \). Table 5.1 lists some of the top (better) and bottom (worse) entries from Ioannidis’ Table, keeping the notation of diagnostic tests. Some of the PPVs, especially for exploratory research with lots of data dredging, get very low PPVs.

Where do his bias adjustments come from? These are just guesses he puts forward. It would be interesting to see if they correlate with some of the better-
known error adjustments, as with multiple testing. If so, maybe Ioannidis’ bias assignments can be seen as giving another way to adjust error probabilities. The trouble is, the dredging can be so tortured in many cases that we’d be inclined to dismiss the study rather than give it a PPV number. (Perhaps confidence intervals around the PPV estimate should be given?)

Ioannidis will also adjust the prevalence according to the group that your research falls into, leading Goodman and Greenland (2007) to charge him with punishing the epidemiologist twice: by bias and low prevalence! I’m sympathetic with those who protest that rather than assume guilt (or innocence) by association (with a given field), it’s better to see what crime was actually committed or avoided by the study at hand. Even bias violations are open to appeal, and may have been gotten around by other means. (No mention is given of failed statistical assumptions, which can quickly turn to mush the reported error probabilities, and preclude the substantive inference that is the actual output of research. Perhaps this could be added.) Others who mount the DS criticism allege that the problem holds even accepting the small \( \alpha \) level and no bias. Their gambit is to sufficiently lower the prevalence of D – which now stands for probability of a “true effect” – so that the PPV is low (e.g., Colquhoun 2014). Colquhoun’s example retains \( \Pr(+|\neg D) = 0.05 \), \( \Pr(+|D) = 0.8 \), but shrinks the prevalence \( \Pr(D) \) of true effects down to 10%. That is, 90% of the nulls in your research universe are true. This yields a PPV of 64%. The \( \Pr(\neg D|+) \) is 0.36, much greater than \( \Pr(+|\neg D) = 0.05 \).

So the DS criticism appears to go through with these computations. What about exporting the terms from significance tests into FFR or PPV assessments? We haven’t said anything about treating \( \neg D \) as \( H_0 \) in the DS criticism.

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Table 5.1 Selected entries from Ioannidis (2005)

| \( \Pr(+|D) \) | PREV of D | Bias | Practical example | PPV  |
|--------------|-----------|------|------------------|------|
| 0.8          | 50%       | 0.10 | Adequately powered RCT, little bias | 0.85 |
| 0.95         | 67%       | 0.30 | Confirmatory meta-analysis of good-quality RCTs | 0.85 |
| 0.8          | 9%        | 0.3  | Adequately powered exploratory epidemiological study | 0.20 |
| 0.2          | 0.1%      | 0.8  | Discovery-oriented exploratory research with massive testing | 0.001 |

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\(^9\) Even without bias, it’s expected that only 50% of statistically significant results will replicate as significantly on the next try, but such a probability is to be expected (Senn 2002). Senn regards such probabilities as irrelevant.
$[\alpha/(1 – \beta)]$ Again

Although we are keen to get away from coarse dichotomies, in the DS model of tests we are to consider just two possibilities: “no effect” and “real effect.” The null hypothesis is treated as $H_0$: 0 effect ($\mu = 0$), while the alternative $H_1$: the discrepancy against which the test has power $(1 – \beta)$. It is assumed the probability for finding any effect, regardless of size, is the same (Ioannidis 2005, p. 0696). Then $[\alpha/(1 – \beta)]$ is used as the likelihood ratio to compute the posterior of either $H_0$ or $H_1$ – a problematic move, as we know.

An example of one of their better tests might have $H_1: \mu = \mu^g$ where $\mu^g$ is the alternative against which the test has 0.9 power. But now the denial of the alternative $H_1$ does not yield the same null hypothesis used to obtain the Type I error probability of 0.05. Instead it would be high, nearly as high as 0.9. Likewise if the null is chosen to have low $\alpha$, then its denial won’t be one against which the test has high power (it will be close to $\alpha$). Thus, the identification of “effect” and “no effect” with the hypotheses used to compute the Type I error probability and power are inconsistent with one another. The most plausible way to construe the DS argument is to assume the critics have in mind a test between a point null $H_0$, or a small interval around it, and a non-exhaustive alternative hypothesis $\mu = \mu_1$ against which there is a specified power such as 0.9. It is known that there are intermediate values of $\mu$, but the inference will just compare two.

The DS critics will give a high PPV to alternatives with high power, which is often taken to be 0.8 or 0.9. We know the computation from Goodman (Section 5.2) that “the truth probability of the null hypothesis drops to 3 percent (= 0.03/(1 + 0.03)).” The PPV for $\mu^g$ is 0.97. We haven’t escaped Senn’s points about the nonsensical and the ludicrous, or making mountains out of molehills. To infer $\mu^g$ based on $\alpha = 0.025$ (one-sided) is to be wrong 90% of the time. We’d expect a more significant result 90% of the time were $\mu^g$ correct. I don’t want to repeat what we’ve seen many times. Even using Goodman’s “precise P-value” yields a high posterior. A DS critic could say: you compute error probabilities but we compute PPV, and our measure is better. So let’s take a look at what the computation might mean.

In the typical illustrations it’s the prevalence that causes the low PPV. But what is it? Colquhoun (2014) identifies $Pr(D)$ with “the proportion of experiments we do over a lifetime in which there is a real effect” (p. 9). Ioannidis (2005) identifies it with “the number of ‘true relationships’ . . . among those tested in the field” (p. 0696). What’s the relevant reference class for the prevalence $Pr(D)$? We scarcely have a list of all hypotheses to be tested in a field, much less do we know the proportion that are “true.” With continuous parameters, it could be claimed there are infinitely many hypotheses;
individuating true ones could be done in multiple ways. Even limiting the considerations to discrete claims (effect/no effect), will quickly land us in quicksand. Classifying by study type makes sense, but any umbrella will house studies from different fields with different proportions of true claims.

One might aver that the PPV calculation is merely a heuristic to show the difference between \( \alpha \) and FFR, or between \( (1 - \alpha) \) and the PPV. It should always be kept in mind that even when a critic has performed a simulation, it is a simulation that assumes ingredients. If aspects of the calculation fail, then of what value is the heuristic? Furthermore, it is clear that the PPV calculation is intended to assess the results of actual tests. Even if we agreed on a reference class, say the proportion of true effects over your lifetime of testing is \( \theta \), this probability \( \theta \) wouldn’t be the probability that a selected effect is “true.” It would not be a frequentist prior probability for the randomly selected hypothesis. We now turn to this.

**Probabilistic Instantiation Fallacy.** Suppose we did manage to do an experiment involving a random selection from an urn of null hypotheses, 1000% assumed to be true. The outcome may be \( X = 1 \) or 0 according to whether the hypothesis we’ve selected is true. Even allowing it’s known that the probability of \( X = 1 \) is 0.5, it does not follow that a specific hypothesis we might choose (say, your blood pressure drug is effective) has a frequentist probability of 0.5 of being true – any more than a particular 0.95 confidence interval estimate has a probability of 0.95. The issue, in this form, often arises in “base rate” criticisms (Mayo 1997a, 1997b, 2005, 2010b, Spanos 2010b).

Is the PPV computation relevant to the very thing that working scientists want to assess: strength of the evidence for effects or their degree of corroboration?

**Crud Factor.** It is supposed in many fields of social and biological science that nearly everything is related to everything: “all nulls are false.” Meehl dubbed this the crud factor. Meehl describes how he and David Lykken conducted a study of the crud factor in psychology in 1966. They used a University of Minnesota student questionnaire sent to 57,000 high school seniors, including family facts, attitudes toward school, leisure activities, educational plans, etc. Cross-tabulating variables including parents’ occupation, education, siblings, birth order, family attitudes, sex, religious preferences, 22 leisure time activities, MCAT scores, etc., all 105 cross-tabulations were statistically significant at incredibly small levels.

These relationships are not, I repeat, Type I errors. They are facts about the world, and with \( N = 57,000 \) they are pretty stable. Some are theoretically easy to explain, others more difficult, others completely baffling. The ‘easy’ ones have multiple explanations, sometimes competing, usually not. Drawing theories from a pot and associating them whimsically
with variable pairs would yield an impressive batch of \( H_0 \)-refuting 'confirmations.' (Meehl 1990, p. 206)

He estimates the crud factor correlation at around 0.3 or 0.4.

So let’s apply Ioannidis’ analysis to two cases. In the first case, we’ve randomly selected a hypothesis from a social science urn with high crud factor. Even if I searched and cherry picked, perhaps looking for ones that correlate well with a theory I have in mind, statistical significance at the 0.05 level would still result in a fairly high prevalence of true claims (D’s) among those found statistically significant. Since the test they passed lacked stringency, I wouldn’t be able to demonstrate a genuine reproducible effect – in the manner that is understood in science. So nothing has been demonstrated about replicability or knowledge of real effects by dint of a high PPV.

You might say high prevalence could never happen with things like correlating genes and disease. But how can we count up the hypotheses? Should they include molecular biology, proteomics, stem cells, etc. Do we know what hypotheses will be conjectured next year? Why not combine fields for estimating prevalence? With a little effort, one could claim to have as high a prevalence as desired.

Now let’s assume we are in one of those low prevalence situations. If I’ve done my homework and went beyond the one \( P \)-value before going into print, checked flaws, tested for violated assumptions, then even if I don’t yet know the causal explanation, I may have a fairly good warrant for taking the effect as real. Having obeyed Fisher, I am in a good position to demonstrate the reality of the published finding.

Avoiding bias and premature publication is what’s doing the work, not prevalence.

There is a seductive blurring of rates of false positives over an imagined population, PPVs, on the one hand, with an assessment of what we know about reproducing any particular effect, on the other, and fans of the DS model fall into this equivocal talk. In other words, “positive predictive value,” in this context, is a misnomer. The number isn’t telling us how valuable the statistically significant result is for predicting the truth or reproducibility of that effect. Nor is it even assuring lots of the findings in the group will be reproducible over time. We want to look at how well tested the particular hypothesis of interest is. We might assess the prevalence with which hypotheses pass highly stringent tests, if false. Now look what’s happened. We have come full circle to evaluating the severity of tests passed. Prevalence has nothing to do with it.

I am reminded of the story of Isaac. Not in the Bible, but in a discussion I had with Erich Lehmann in Princeton (when his wife was working at the Educational Testing Services). It coincided with a criticism by Colin Howson (1997a,b) to the effect that low prevalence (or “base rates”) negates severity of
test. Isaac is a high school student who has passed (+) a battery of tests for D: “college-readiness.” It is given that Pr(+|¬D) is 0.05, while Pr(+|D) ~1. But because he was randomly selected from Fewready town, where the prevalence of readiness is only 0.001, Pr(D|+) is still very low. Had Isaac been randomly selected from Manyready suburb with high (Pr(D), then Pr(D|+) is high. In fact, Isaac, from Fewready town, would have to score quite a bit higher than if he had come from Manyready suburb for the same PPV. There is a real policy question here that officials disagree on. Should we demand higher test scores from students in Fewready town to ensure overall college-readiness amongst those accepted by college admissions boards? Or would that be a kind of reverse affirmative action?

We might go further and imagine Alex from Manyready scored lower than Isaac, maybe even cheated on just one or two questions. Even if their PPVs are equal, I submit that Isaac is in a better position to demonstrate his college readiness.

The Dangers of the Diagnostic Screening Model for Science

What then can we infer is replicable? Claims that have passed with severity. If subsequent tests corroborate the severity assessment of an initial study, then it is replicated. But severity is not the goal of science. Lots of true but trivial claims are not the goal. Science seeks growth of knowledge and understanding. To take the diagnostic-screening model literally, by contrast, would point the other way: keep safe.

Large-scale evidence should be targeted for research questions where the pre-study probability is already considerably high, so that a significant research finding will lead to a post-test probability that would be considered quite definitive. (Ioannidis 2005, p. 0700)

Who would pursue seminal research that challenged the reigning biological paradigm, as did Prusiner, doggedly pursuing, over decades, the cause of mad cow and related diseases, and the discovery of prions? Would Eddington have gone to all the trouble of testing the deflection effect in Brazil? Newton was predicting fine. Replication is just a small step toward getting real effects. Lacking the knowledge of how to bring about an effect, and how to use it to change other known and checkable effects, your PPV may be swell but your science could be at a dead-end. To be clear: its advocates surely don’t recommend the “keep safe” consequence, but addressing it is worthwhile to further emphasize the difference between good science and a good scorecard.

10 Peter Achinstein and I have debated this on and off for years Achinstein 2010; Mayo 1997a, 2005, 2010c).
There are contexts in which the screening viewpoint is useful. Beyond diagnostic screening of disease, high-throughput testing of microarray data seeks to control the rates of genes worth following up. Nevertheless, we argue that the PPV does not quantify how well tested, warranted, or plausible a given scientific hypothesis is (including ones about genetic associations where a DS model is apt). I’m afraid the DS model has introduced confusion into the literature, by mixing up the probability of a Type I error (often called the “false positive rate”) with the posterior probability given by the FFR: \( \Pr(H_0 | H_0 \text{ is rejected}) \). Equivocation is encouraged. In frequentist tests, reducing the Type II error probability results in increasing the Type I error probability: there is a trade-off. In the DS model, the trade-off disappears: reducing the Type II error rate also reduces the FFR.

Much of Ioannidis’ work is replete with sagacious recommendations for better designs. My aim here was the limited one of analyzing the diagnostic screening model of tests. That it’s the basis for popular reforms underscores the need for scrutiny.